Wednesday, October 18, 2006

Double Standard in Peru

Abimael Guzman, leader of the Shining Path guerrilla movement in Peru, and his partner Elena Iparraguirre, were found this week to be guilty of terrorism and have been given life imprisonment. The objective of the Shining Path, inspired by Chairman Mao, is to overthrow the Peruvian state. An estimated total of 70,000 people died in the terrorism and counter-terrorism campaigns that it is responsible for initiating. Its most brutal acts involved killings conducted in rural villages to make the severity of its cause known to the government.

In June ex-army officer Ollanta Humala very nearly became the president of Peru but lost to career politician Alan Garcia. Controversy surrounds his involvement in the counter-terrorism campaign against the Shining Path; he is accused of forced disappearance, torture and murder based on testimonies from families of the victims. He was expelled from the army in 2000 after his revolt against President Fujimori failed and rallied Peru’s poor for his support for the 2006 elections.

In terms of the quantity of human rights abuses committed by these two men, Abimael Guzman is clearly in a different league than Ollanta Humala. Guzman embodies the cause of acute suffering for tens of thousands of people. But from a governmental perspective, the gravest damages he inflicted were upon the legitimacy of the state. One of the defining characteristics of a state is that it has a monopoly on coercive power. In order to maintain its sovereignty the state cannot allow any faction within it to claim that its own use of violence is legitimate. These two cases, though very different in the scale of crimes committed, serve to illustrate how human rights abuses that occur during an operation in defense of the state, even though those who commit them represent law and order, can more easily be swept under the rug than human rights abuses committed in a civilian project to undermine the state.

Sources:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6048144.stm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4800691.stm

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Tuesday, October 17, 2006

Article Review

“Five Lessons Bush Learned from Argentina’s Dirty War and Five Lessons for the Rest of Us”

The comparison drawn by Renate Lunn, in her article entitled “Five Lessons Bush Learned from Argentina’s Dirty War and Five Lessons for the Rest of Us”, is one that would surprise the majority of United States citizens. She systematically describes how the dictatorship responsible for the Dirty War of 1976-1983 in Argentina and the government orchestrating the “War on Terror” in the US today are strikingly similar in their tactics and goals. Lunn argues that just as military and political figures in US and Latin America have shared practices of quelling dissent and amassing power, so too should the people of the Americas pool their experiences and tactics for the resistance of state sponsored repression. The significance of this article is that it not only draws the US into a shared history with repressive Latin American regimes, but a shared set of specific strategies and practices.

Lunn begins by summarizing US policies and practices which perpetuated state repression in Latin America. Fearing the spread of Communism in what it considered its backyard, the US government actively supported Latin American regimes committed to the eradication of leftist organizations. In many cases, this was done through the instruction and indoctrination of Latin American military personnel in the School of the Americas. Furthermore, the US often turned a blind eye to the actions of these regimes, and severe human rights abuses were not condemned or punished.

Lunn then turns the tables, asserting that dictatorial practices in Latin America, specifically in the Dirty War, are now being replicated by the US for the repression of its own populace. The students of the School of the Americas are now the teachers of the US government. This idea, that President Bush has “learned” his policies and practices from the Dirty War in Argentina, is inaccurate if taken literally but it serves the purpose of equating him morally and logically to Dirty War leaders. President Bush is at the forefront of a government that has no need to study or mimic to engage in repression, having an abundant history of connections with repressive governments and entrenched apparatuses for its own forms of dirty war.

Five points of similarity between the Dirty War and the “War on Terror” are discussed in turn with evidence of how each was manifested in the two countries. The first two points concern tactics used by both the Bush administration and the Argentine dictatorship to create an environment for total governmental control: 1) “wage a vast war against an undefined enemy” and 2) “create a culture of fear” (Lunn). The remaining three points describe their common objectives to: 3) “consolidate state power” 4) “suppress dissent” and 5) “mobilize economic resources to the benefit of the elite” (Lunn). The similarities are accurate and are sufficiently substantiated for an article of moderate length. It must be said, however, that part of the accuracy of these points can be attributed to the fact that they are very general and therefore can be interpreted according to the unique circumstances of each country.

At certain points I found that the comparisons that Lunn makes could be elaborated upon. For instance, she discusses how in Argentina during the Dirty War and in the US today, the claim of numerous sources of potential danger and the lack of a precise definition of the enemy justify “the need for heightened security” (Lunn). She might have expanded this idea by saying that this heightened security, justified by a vaguely defined enemy, not only justifies the suppression of dissent but the use of excessive severity when doing so. In Argentina, a civilian who was deemed to be “subversive” could be abducted by military personnel in broad daylight, and today a person can be detained indefinitely by the US government who is no more than suspected of engaging in terrorist activity. Tens of thousands of people in Argentina and hundreds of thousands of people in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan have been killed in the name of Argentine and US security respectively and this has been presented by governments and the media to the public as legitimate and necessary.

Also, Lunn could have taken her comparison of “creating a culture of fear” further by discussing the creation of a culture of ignorance and distraction. Not only have the authorities of both countries made concerted efforts to, as Lunn describes, instill fear in the public, but also to keep them in the dark and draw their attention away from government activity. A widespread lack of awareness of the nature and extent of human rights abuses condoned and practiced by the Argentine dictatorship and current US government promotes fear in potential victims (who do not know what will become of them if they are deemed a threat) and complacency in those who do not consider themselves likely be singled out (fostering the impression that those who are must deserve it in some way). Another tactic employed by both countries, where the media and government are so closely tied, is to distract the people with sensational stories and prominent debate over relatively minor issues. The day after the 1976 military coup in Argentina, for example, the front page of the Argentine daily newspaper Clarín reported this event alongside the announcement that Argentina had triumphed over Poland in football (Beasley-Murray). Recently the US media was dominated by the Mark Foley scandal, showing that lewd instant messages have more power to make Republicans sweat from public disapproval than the costly and disastrous war in Iraq (Beinhart). Sex and sport have always been good antidotes for harsh political realities.

As Lunn concedes, the similarity between these two events has its limitations. However, the purpose of holding them side by side is not to see a mirror image but to examine them in the same context. By constantly switching back and forth between the Dirty War and the “War on Terror” throughout the article, and using the same terms to describe them, Lunn aims to bind them tightly together in an alarming association. US citizens need to realize that the “War on Terror” is not just a war being fought on foreign lands against peoples who are construed as incomprehensible and dangerous, but just like in Argentina, it is a war waged by the state against its own citizens in the form of reducing and denying human rights, creating a state of fear and misinformation, and cutting social funding to finance war expenditures.

At the end of the article, Lunn describes five strategies that Argentineans developed in resistance to the Dirty War, and afterward, to expose and record abuses and prevent them from happening again. The strategies, such as publicizing factual accounts of the forced disappearances and building alliances with activists abroad, work together to create a politically and historically aware public within a network of local and international communication. Lunn describes President Bush as a pupil of Argentine history and she appeals to US citizens to do the same. These strategies are just as applicable to Americans who want to resist and expose the abuses of the “War on Terror” as to Argentineans who during and after the Dirty War created an informed public consciousness about it. The importance of proposing a contemporary American usage of these strategies is that it pulls the histories of both countries together into an ongoing pan-American struggle against repressive regimes.

The very fact that Lunn makes this systematic and direct comparison between the Dirty War, a universally condemned example of atrocious human rights abuses committed by a state against its populace, and the “War on Terror” of the Bush administration, makes this article highly significant in contemporary human rights discourses in the United States. Lunn is among those working to raise US public awareness that the “War on Terror” is a war not just on “them” but on “us” as well. She maintains throughout the article a tension between citizen and state, especially when describing the abuses of the latter, which gives the reader even more of a reason to take her lessons from Argentina to heart. It is by presenting these lessons that Lunn reveals her stance that citizens, rather than the institutions that govern them, are the starting point for an analysis of a better world, and that ignorance and isolation within a populace are more dangerous than institutional corruption.

Works Cited:
Beasley-Murray, Jon. Posthegemony. 24 March 2006. 15 October 2006. http://posthegemony.blogspot.com/2006/03/normality.html.
Beinhart, Larry. "Let's Face It, Penises Dominate American Politics." AlterNet. 7 October 2006. 15 October 2006. http://www.alternet.org/story/42670.
Lunn, Renate. "Five Lessons Bush Learned from Argentina’s Dirty War and Five Lessons for the Rest of Us." ZNet. 8 December 2005. 15 October 2006. http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=42&ItemID=9288.

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Sunday, October 08, 2006

Don’t Be Unreasonable

Humane treatment doesn’t extend to those who aren’t human. The justification for the cruel treatment of indigenous Latin Americans and the seizure of their possessions by the conquistadors was that they were not endowed with reason, humanity’s defining characteristic, which ranked them in some nether region between man and beast. In this way the doctrine of natural servitude developed – that there was a category of people whose reasoning powers were defective and could aspire to nothing greater than servitude to a master who would govern them with the sound judgment they lacked.

The gap between Europeans and Latin Americans on the scale of humanity began to close as the justifications for conquest were publicly debated. Las Casas, for example, discredited the idea that the indigenous people were ignorant and incapable of governing themselves with his firsthand accounts to the contrary. He presented them as having a great capacity for learning and the power of self-determination. He also refuted prejudices with the amusing deduction that if an entire continent of beings, who showed all indications of being human, were actually defective in some crucial aspect, it could only mean that Nature and God had screwed up rather badly. This preposterous and blasphemous idea certainly couldn’t be true – which proved that the inhabitants of the New World must be human after all.

This debate eventually reached the consensus that the indigenous were indeed people, albeit in a lesser stage of development. There are numerous metaphors for this stage – their minds were uncultivated land, wild but fertile for the planting of orderly and productive crops – they were also eager pupils and the Europeans were their patient instructors – or children who need an adult to responsibly manage their affairs and finances until they come of age.

There are various motivations behind recognizing in the indigenous people the faculty of reason. If the mental capacity of the indigenous people was doubted, so too would their ability to adopt Christian principals, depriving the Church of its reason to expand its influence into the New World. Another motivation behind allowing indigenous Latin Americans into the club of reasonable peoples was so that they could become useful economic actors for the Spanish monarchy. This was Joseph Campillo’s argument – give the indigenous people the stamp of reason so that they may become labouring cogs in the international money-making machine of the colonial powers.

That the people of Latin America lacked the faculty of reason was the initial justification for the abuse of their rights and freedoms. However, when this idea was discredited by religious and scholarly debate, the exploitation of this land and its peoples, and intervention in their affairs continued, sometimes under new pretexts, often under old ones.

“I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist because of the irresponsibility of its people.”
– Secretary of State Henry Kissinger commenting on the election of Salvador Allende as president of Chile in 1970.

Reading:
Zavala, Silvio. The Defense of Human Rights in Latin America. Paris: UNESCO, 1964.
Quote:
Gill, Lesley. The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004.

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Monday, October 02, 2006

No Child Left Alone

Yesterday I came across this investigation by the Associated Press and, despite not being about Latin America, I had to comment on it.

As part of the No Child Left Behind Act (2001), public schools must give the names and phone numbers of their students to military recruiters if they want to receive funding. Recently, the Associated Press revealed that 1 out 200 of these recruiters were disciplined for sexual misconduct last year. These military employees have unusually easy access to the contact information of students, including home address and phone number, cell number and email, as well as legitimate occasions to be alone with them in offices and cars.

Most of those who reported sexual misconduct, from molestation to rape, were girls between 16 and 18 years of age. This situation is so dangerous because the recruiters are perceived to be trustworthy by the public and they have authority over the young people who want to enlist. Because detailed information about students is highly accessible, individuals such as Sergeant Eric Vetesy, who sexually assaulted six female high school recruits in 2002-2003, can select teenagers with backgrounds that make them vulnerable to coercion.

For a number of reasons, military recruiters in the U.S. today are having difficulty meeting their quotas. As a result, a significant number of recruiters are becoming more and more persistent and persuasive when dealing with young people, calling them on their cell phones and making visits at home and in the classroom, despite objections from parents and teachers. There has recently been a rise in crimes pertaining to coercion, harassment, and document falsification.

The right to have personal information kept private by institutions such as schools and hospitals should not be taken away, because as this case shows, those who lack this privacy are left terribly vulnerable.

Source:
http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=06/08/23/1413222

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Sunday, October 01, 2006

Las Casas Arguments

Though Las Casas does mention specific rights (defense, retribution, freedom), he doesn’t present his experiences in the New World in the context of human rights abuse, as would a modern exposé.

Throughout the document, Las Casas appeals to the compassion and reason of the reader to convince him or her of the cruel practices and false pretexts of the conquest. In doing so he describes how three kinds of law (natural, human, divine) are being broken and defiled in the New World.

Firstly, Las Casas presents the conquest as being in conflict with natural law – the law that demands that humans act compassionately and justly towards one another. It is this law that makes us understand the actions that Las Casas describes (torture, mass-murder, demotion of men to beasts, harsh treatment of women and children) as universally despicable. It is part of natural law that all human life has value and all humans have the right to defend what is valuable in that life.

Secondly, Las Casas presents the conquest as contrary to human law – the laws of human society. Las Casas asserts on page 52 that “At no stage had any order been issued entitling [the Spanish generals] to massacre the people or enslave them”. Not only were the generals committing the crime of falsely acting in the name of the Spanish Crown, but they were acting in contradiction to Spanish law which stated that the indigenous peoples of the New World were free peoples, not to be subjected to extermination or slavery. Furthermore, says Las Casas, people cannot legally be punished, as the indigenous people were, for rebelling against a power that had imposed itself on them.

Thirdly, Las Casas presents the conquest as an affront to divine law. Basically, because the Spaniards had forfeited God for gold and were committing mortal sins, and the indigenous people perished without ever having known of or believed in God, everyone in the New World was damned to go to Hell. Las Casas gives evidence of how the Spaniards earned God’s wrath when their ships sank and their city was ravaged by natural disaster.

The fact that the conquest conflicts with these three laws is how Las Casas frames his opposition to it.

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